SILAN CHAI.
238
14.
The most difficult part of the problem which confronts us at this moment is the protection of our interests at Shanghai. If this cannot be arranged by diplomatic methode, it may be necessary to
resort to force. Our Secretary informs us that the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs has expressed the wish that we should
approach this subject on the assumption that Shanghai is to be hold
in all ei rcumstances. In view of the vastness of the British and
international interests at stake we agree that this is the only point
of view from which the subject can be appro.ched.
Thos o
15. The prosunt situation is that Shanghai is liable to attack by Nationalist armies up to a strength of 80,000 man, with artillery
and aeroplanes. The precise fighting value to be placed on these forces is difficult to determine, but is certainly not high.
forces, according to local reports, might reach Shanghai any time
after January 22nd. The only existing forces at Shanghai are the Municipal Police and the Shanghai Volunteers believed to number over
2,000, but arrangemonts have been made for the reinforcement of
these by 4,000 British, American, French and Japanese troops.
The British contingent will consist of the Indian Battalion at
Hong Kong which, as already mentioned, is held ready to proceed at
short notice, and no further British reserves are available nearer
than India, whonce troops could not arrive within less than 6 to 8
weaks from the date of the order. When the whole of this reinforce-
ment of 4,000 men has been assembled, we cannot regard the total force available as more than sufficient for the purpose of
maintaining order amid a possibly hostile population of over
1,000,000. For guarding the large perimeter of Shanghai against attack by the Chinese Nationalist Army, considerably larger
forces would be required, which we estimate as at lesst
ono Division and a Squadron of aircraft over and above
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